Hindu Editorial Summary- 18 June 11

Hindu Editorial – ‘Friends for ever’ pts.

Basically the editorial talks about the relationship between Pakistan and US. The editorial underlines the various recent progress nd happenings in  between the two nations. The US Defence Secy says abt regional stability nd calls the behavior of Pak towards arresting der spies (CIA) as pure business nd doesn’t consider it to affect der relations…
1. Osama was killed on May 2 ,2011
2. Militants attacked the Mehran Base—May 22
3. Pak claims arresting a Army Major
4. Pak Ambassador to US-- Husain Haqqani
5. Another is a Haqqani group which is a insurgent group in North Waziristan closely related with Taliban
6. U.S. counter-terrorism  scale (1-10)…Pak cooperation rated 3
7. US Defence Secretary – Robert Gates
8. Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani  viewed as pro-American by New York Times
9. A term ‘mensis horribilis’ is used which means a general discussion.

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Editorial on Budget by The Tribune

Focus is on masses, not classes
 
It is a budget for the masses, not classes. It offers small giveaways here and there but takes care not to hurt anybody ahead of assembly elections. The 2010-11 Union Budget’s thrust is on the social sector in keeping with the UPA government’s goal of inclusive growth. It carries the stamp of Congress president Sonia Gandhi. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s reforms may have to wait. Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee is a pragmatic politician and he is best suited for building a consensus on controversial reforms like the goods and services tax (GST), diesel decontrol, labour law amendments, foreign investment in multi-brand retail, banking and PSU privatisation. 

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The GST, when implemented, would have far-reaching consequences on the economy in terms of lowering taxes and raising revenue by curbing tax evasion and the spread of black money. 

Benefits for classes are limited. The salaried class may be disappointed by a modest hike in the tax exemption limit but there is a major reason to cheer. Those having salary as the only income will not have to file returns any more. 

The Budget has reduced the age limit for senior citizens from 65 to 60 for being entitled to the tax exemption limit of Rs 2, 50,000, while for those above 80 a new tax exemption limit of Rs 5,00,000 has been created. Health check-ups in private hospitals will become more expensive. Domestic and foreign travel will cost more as also eating out in AC restaurants. 

This time the fair sex has got no special treatment. Those fond of branded clothes will feel the pinch. 

Aanganwari workers have a reason to rejoice as their pay has been justifiably doubled. 

Soldiers suffering 100 per cent disability in service will get Rs 9 lakh compensation on a par with security personnel fighting the Maoists. 

In the clash between inflation and growth the Finance Minister has favoured the former, which is desirable both politically and morally since the fruits of growth are enjoyed by a small section. From March 2012 those living below the poverty line will start getting cash instead of subsidised fertilisers and fuel. Nandan Nilekani’s Adhaar scheme, when implemented, would make this possible. 

Sonia Gandhi’s favourite project, the National Food Security Bill, is on the table but Pranab Mukherjee has not given details of the fiscal impact of its implementation. Higher spending on education, health and infrastructure is welcome though it is still below the desirable levels.
To control inflation and achieve double-digit growth it has often been suggested that agriculture should be rejuvenated. The budget has increased credit flows to farmers by Rs 1lakh crore. 

Farmers who repay their loans in time will have to pay 3-4 per cent lower interest than the market rates. To step up production and productivity, the budget provides Rs 300 crore each for pulses, oilseeds, vegetables and nutri-cereals like millet and maize. Since 40 per cent of food items go waste in the absence of adequate storage and processing, the budget focusses on some such grey areas. Cold storage chains will get infrastructure status, which means cheaper credit. This may attract higher private investment and help eliminate bottlenecks in food supplies. 


Industry had feared a rollback of tax benefits given in 2008 to help it cope with global slowdown. That has not happened. Instead the surcharge on domestic companies has been cut to 5 per cent from 7.5 per cent. The minimum alternate tax (MAT) has been slightly raised from 18 per cent to 18.5 per cent. The Sensex shot up after the budget but the gains were trimmed to 122 points by the close. Currently, business confidence is low as interest rates are hardening. The surge in global oil prices due to trouble in the Middle East has led to capital outflows. 

For foreign institutional investors (FIIs) a high fiscal deficit is also a matter of concern. The Finance Minister has sent a positive message by bringing down fiscal deficit to 5.1 per cent. FIIs, however, are skeptical about his claims of bringing fiscal deficit further down to 4.6 per cent and ensuring 9 per cent growth in a difficult year ahead. One positive is the government will resort to lower market borrowings and this will reduce pressure on money supply and subsequently on interest rates. High interest rates raise the cost of capital and hurt growth. All in all, given the constraints — political and global — it is hard to find much fault with the budget. Its goal of inclusive growth is right. The fiscal deficit may be under control but it is governance deficit which is becoming unmanageable. Elections are won not just by tall promises but by strong performance.

Bihar has shown votes follow development.

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A New Engagement (Editorial abt relation betwwen India and Arab World in context of Libya !!!)


With each passing day, it becomes more certain that Libya's revolution will not be resolved as swiftly and bloodlessly as Tunisia's and Egypt's did. The Gaddafi clan does not mean to go quietly, and with a section of the military backing them to the hilt, the country is teetering on the brink of civil war.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states watch anxiously while scrambling to use a mixture of palliative measures and heavy-handedness to pacify their own restive populaces. The UN continues to condemn the Libyan regime. Iran is subject to democracy pressures itself but jostles for advantage in West Asia and North Africa.

It's a difficult situation for New Delhi. When the people's push for democracy had momentum as it did in Tunisia and Egypt, deciding on a policy was relatively easier. But in the far murkier waters of Libya and the Gulf where the tussle could be a protracted one, calibrating a response becomes far more difficult. Consider the stakes for New Delhi.

The UAE overtook the US in 2008-09 to become India's largest trading partner, a position it continues to hold today. India's energy security calculus revolves around the region as well. Currently, it is the sixth largest net importer of oil in the world - it's expected to be the fourth largest by 2025 - and imports 70% of its oil needs. Of those imports, 70% comes from the Middle East. Factor in the massive Indian diasporas in the Gulf countries and the complexity of the problem becomes clear.

New Delhi's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states has stood it in good stead in the past, and there is no need to abandon it in case of the turmoil roiling the Arab world. However, it does present an opportunity to project New Delhi's soft power, which is considerable in the region. It presents a working democratic model in a sociocultural environment far closer to the Gulf's than western democracies are - and with none of the political baggage of the latter.

Leveraging this soft power will require a multi-pronged effort. A start could be made by helping set up the electoral process in Egypt as the US has already requested, to the extent called for by the Egyptians. Participating in diplomatic, humanitarian and democracy-building initiatives in the region whenever asked for, while deepening civil society engagement - are all options. It will not be an easy process. But it is in New Delhi's interests to start such an engagement and seize the opportunities that open up.


Source-- TOI



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Cautiously optimistic (Economic Survey --The Hindu Editorial)


The Economic Survey 2010-11 is positive on the macroeconomy without glossing over the challenges. The economy's resilience is seen in its ability to withstand two shocks in quick succession. The ripple effects of the global economic crisis (2007-09) that devastated world growth, trade, and finances have persisted in the form of the European fiscal crisis. 

On the domestic front, the farm sector that saw a negative growth in 2008-09 was further hit by erratic monsoons, severe drought, and unseasonal rains in two successive years. Despite this, the economy is poised to grow at rates seen during the pre-crisis period. On top of an estimated 8.6 per cent growth during the current year, the economy is projected to grow at 9 per cent during 2011-12. The optimistic forecasts as well as the downside risks are in line with the assessment of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council. 

The services sector, for long “the power house of the economy”, with a more than 57 per cent share of the GDP in 2009-10, has started gaining momentum. That should augur well for the medium term growth prospects. Another favourable feature is that India's demographic dividend is yet to peak. The growing trend in savings and investment rates should benefit from the gradual withdrawal of stimulus measures by the government. In a message that could be a pointer to the strategy in the Budget, the Survey notes that once the economy operates around full capacity, it is not the savings and investment rates that will drive growth but skills development and innovation.

http://trak.in/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Indian_economic_recovery1.jpgThe major downside risks to growth are weather, a disproportionate spike in petroleum prices, and a slowdown in the advanced economies. Inflation and a large current account deficit are major concerns. The Survey cautions that higher growth and a faster monetisation of the economy, through financial inclusion, may mean increased money supply and hence more inflationary pressures. It has recommended a phased entry of foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail, apparently in response to the concerns of farmers and consumers. That should also add to stable capital flows. Given its upbeat tone on growth, the Finance Minister is expected to meet the fiscal targets. As part of its reform agenda, the Survey calls for a streamlining of land acquisition and environment clearance procedures, using smart cards to target subsidy payments and issuance of basic banking licences. There should be an unrelenting thrust on infrastructure development. None of these is new or visionary but the Survey has stressed the doable and underlined the priorities in a way that demonstrates pragmatism.

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Let some fresh air in (An Editorial regarding the Jamia Milia Islamia University being granted a minority status)

Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia university being granted a ‘minority status’ has been celebrated by many, including newspapers, as happy news and one which gives Muslims ‘due justice’. Some of Jamia’s teachers and staff even distributed sweets to mark the announcement, which will allow the university to reserve 50% seats for Muslims. 
 

http://www.keralaevents.com/eventphotos/99/Jamia_Millia_Islamia.jpgAs someone who’s lived all his life near the university and studied there, I don’t support this minority tag, despite the fact that the lobby supporting it is far stronger than I could imagine. If the aim of the minority status is to uplift the community from its backwardness, I think it’s only going to push the Muslims into a deeper ghetto. Inclusive growth is possible only with an eclectic diversity of students and staff. Jamia already has enough ‘Muslim’ character, and it does not need any legal status to ensure it. 

Those seeking the minority status argue that leaders like Mohammad Ali Jauhar and Hakim Ajmal Khan established Jamia in 1920, as “they wanted Muslims to keep their education in their own hands, free from governmental interference.” But why do we forget that 1920 was the British period and Jamia was established as a reaction to British interference in Aligarh’s Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO) started by Sir Sayyad Ahmed Khan

Why should we apply the same to the present democratic government, which gives aid to the university? Leaders like Jauhar, Ajmal Khan and others, who we invoke today, were not against non-Muslims taking part in Jamia’s development. Their secular ideals and actions were far greater than what we can aspire to. At one time in Jamia’s history, the lack of funds forced the staff to get one piece of bread a day as salary! Can any staff member or student think of emulating such ideals today? Times have changed and so have the Muslim community and Jamia. If we invoke the name of Ajmal Khan and Jauhar today, we’re only ‘using’ them for selfish gains.

The example of St Stephen’s College in Delhi is often used to justify Jamia’s minority character, as the former already has the status of a Christian institution. I think Jamia’s case can’t be compared with that of St Stephen’s for several reasons. Both institutions have very different histories and objectives. Jamia had a direct involvement with India’s freedom struggle, whereas St Stephen’s was established — according to its prospectus — as a “religious foundation drawing inspiration from the life and teachings of Jesus Christ” by a Christian mission from Westcott House, Cambridge.

Second, the quality of education in both institutions is very different — today, St Stephen’s is considered one of the top Delhi colleges whereas, sadly, Jamia (with the exception of some departments) does not feature high in students’ preference lists. But St Stephen’s high standards have nothing to do with its minority status. It is a part of a long tradition of quality education that convent institutions have diligently held up. Its minority status, while setting precedence for others, was not implemented to uplift the economic condition of Christians but preserve their culture and values.

If the aim of Jamia is to preserve its ‘Muslimness’, then there has never been any compromise on that. According to the present vice-chancellor, Jamia already has 51% Muslim students, and applying the minority status would have no particular effect. For a religious character, Jamia campus and its surroundings have several mosques, Jamia’s staff can take off from work for prayer, can work for lesser hours during Ramazan, school students are taught Urdu and Islamic theology and girl students can wear a veil, besides many other advantages they never get in any ‘mainstream’ institution. Jamia recognises degrees from Islamic madrasas as qualification for admissions into its courses like BA and MA, allowing thousands of madrasa students to get secular education and professional training. Jamia has departments of Urdu, Arabic, Persian and Islamic Studies. The university’s name itself has ‘Islamia’ in it. All this to ensure that ‘Islamic’ culture is upheld even without the minority character.

I think Muslims fear that while being victimised elsewhere in the country with communal biases and violence, their institutions will also get filled with non-Muslims, which would usurp the already shrunk spaces. But won’t accepting mostly Muslim teachers and students in Jamia prevent the entry of bright students and teachers from other communities, whose presence could create a progressive and competitive atmosphere? Interacting with a wide diversity of people is good not only for students’ careers but also to reduce communal prejudices and perceptions of victimisation.

The minority tag has outlived its use and needs to be discarded.

Yousuf Saeed is a Delhi-based independent filmmaker and researcher. The views expressed by the author are personal

Source-- Hindustan Times

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The Jasmine Revolution


Of the world’s 22 Arab states, Tunisia seemed to be the least likely to witness a popular revolution that would force an autocratic president to flee the country. 

http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/files/2011/02/JasminRevolution-400x300.png For decades, it was a showcase for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund — a success story of economic reform and structural adjustment. Yet, the revolution came despite a brutal police state, positive growth rates, and decades-long Western support of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s corrupt regime.



Many Arab countries share some or all of these characteristics, but Tunisia has certain unique features that, combined, have contributed to the success of this democratic revolt.

Unlike many Arab states, Tunisia has a broad middle class, which is highly educated and politically conscious. In the 1960s and 1970s, Habib Bourguiba, the “founder of modern Tunisia,” invested large portions of the state budget in education and in promoting a sizable middle class.

Tunisian society is homogenous and moderate in orientation and demands. Its Islamic movement al-Nahdah (Renaissance Movement) is considered progressive and moderate. For decades, it has embraced the progressive Personal Status Code and the rights of women, which Bourguiba had enshrined in the Tunisian society, recognized pluralism and coexistence of all political and ideological forces, and advocated democracy as the system of government.

http://www.merriam-webster.com/maps/images/maps/tunisia_map.gif
 
Tunisia is highly urbanized, which explains how protests spread quickly throughout the country. Despite the fact that the revolt began as a spontaneous youth uprising, the political infrastructure with a long history of popular struggle fueled its momentum. Student, teacher, labor and lawyer syndicates showed extraordinary defiance to Ben Ali’s repressive machine, and their steadfastness neutralized the military which refused to carry out the falling president’s orders to shoot at the demonstrators.

Since independence in 1956, Tunisia’s unique military has been de-politicized with a small budget and a civilian head. With 30,000 men, the contingent is smaller in size than the inflated security and police forces that Ben Ali built to safeguard his regime. These elements contributed to the success of the revolution and were ignited by a deep feeling of humiliation at the personal and societal levels.

The act of the educated young Tunisian from the small town of Sidi Bouzeid, who set himself ablaze thus igniting a nation-wide popular revolt, was a protest message not only against poverty, but mainly against humiliation and repression. The demonstrations that ensued held up freedom and dignity among their foremost demands.

The Tunisian revolt will send shock waves to other autocratic Arab regimes and to their western backers. Arab citizens will try to emulate it, while regimes and their western allies will try to contain the growing popular wrath.

It is not difficult to predict who might be next, especially considering most Arab states are corrupt, repressive and frustrating their people’s aspirations for change. Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon could be likely candidates, but what is certain is that the Arab world will not be the same after the successful revolution in Tunisia.

The revolution has shattered several myths: the myth of Middle Eastern democratic exceptionalism, the myth of achieving economic reform without political liberalization, and the myth that western backing of autocratic regimes in the region will maintain stability and protect western strategic interests.

Tunisians who bravely battled Ben Ali’s repressive machine in a non-violent and peaceful resistance show that the key to stability is freedom, dignity and democracy.

This is a lesson that western states have to learn as well. Supporting autocratic regimes and denying the citizens of the region their legitimate rights out of fear of Islamists and change is unethical and cannot be sustained.

The calls for change go beyond grand ideologies, Islamic or leftist, and center on concrete and clear demands that the people of the region now share: freedom, dignity, social justice and democracy.

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US and Iran could become strategic allies – with India's help US and Iran could become strategic allies – with India's help

Tighter sanctions and military threats haven't swayed Iran over its nuclear program. What the West really needs is genuine rapprochement – the kind that India is especially suited to facilitate

 

The standoff with Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program continues. While Washington is arming its Gulf Arab allies in a process of ‘strategic containment,’ hardliners are seeking tighter sanctions and even military options to coerce Iran into compliance.



But these options remain untenable. The "Gulf Security Dialogue" simply postpones the inevitable, neglecting Iran’s unconventional strengths. Sanctions antagonize Tehran, while Russia, Turkmenistan, China, and even smugglers fill the void in Iran’s energy sector. Military strikes and sabotage may set-back but not end Iran’s nuclear program, and provoke Iran to take countermeasures like mining the Strait of Hormuz – not to mention the political backlash. Regime change by support for anti-Tehran militant groups only aggravates Iran, while Iran's democracy movements are calling for civil rights, not government overthrow. And with America trapped in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran could easily play spoiler.

There is a better option: a genuine rapprochement.
As the US withdraws from Iraq, stability there and in the Levant is contingent on Iranian cooperation. In Afghanistan, more than 70 percent and 40 percent of NATO’s supplies and fuel, respectively, pass through northern Pakistan. This is the only transport link between the Arabian Sea and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Afghanistan, keeping the West beholden to Islamabad’s every whim and its supplies subject to attack within Pakistan.

Multiple benefits
A transport link through Iran would reduce this vulnerability, while easing Islamabad’s own security burden. Coordination with Iran would help bring the Afghan warlords in Tehran’s sphere of influence into the political process, and open up a stable trade route to Central Asia.

A US-Iran understanding would also distance Iran from China, countering the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy in South and Central Asia – a greater imperative in light of China’s recently inaugurated Turkmenistan-China pipeline and talk of an Iran-Pakistan-China energy link.

Even Iran would benefit from a US détente. With three million opium users, Iran is the greatest victim of the Afghan opium trade, while the Taliban that threatens the West is similarly anathema to Iran. By partnering with US forces, Iran can direct its influence toward shared strategic aims: countering narcotics trafficking, intelligence cooperation, and stabilizing Afghanistan. The Iranians would also be assured that America would not use Iraq or the Gulf to attack them.

Iran’s geography, petro-power, and Islamist credentials inevitably empower Tehran. America would only benefit if this influence aligned with its own interests. Engaging Iran also opens up its 77-million-strong population to foreign trade and contact after decades of sanctions, strengthening civil society. A lack of engagement, however, leaves the field open for competitors like China to fill the gap.
But the biggest obstacle to a détente today is Iran’s controversial nuclear program.


The US has flanked Iran from the east in Afghanistan, the west in Iraq, the north through US troops in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and the south via the Gulf States. For the Iranians, the best way to resist a hostile United States is an opaque nuclear program – one that is only likely to come clean when American antagonism is gone.


But American “overtures” to this end have been half-hearted at best. American support for anti-Tehran groups like Jundallah and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq continue, while military plans and sanctions have always been the go-to option, limiting the political space for a détente. Tack on Iran’s missile tests, and refusal to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or to end belligerency in Iraq, and it’s easy to see why the debilitating stalemate continues.
How India could help

Enter India, Washington’s new strategic partner.
In the 1990s, many saw a burgeoning “New Delhi-Tehran Axis” in India and Iran’s enhanced economic and strategic ties, including shared opposition to the Taliban. But under American pressure after 2005, India repeatedly voted to condemn Iran in the IAEA.

While failing to coerce Iran, these votes harmed Indo-Iranian relations: 

Indian plans to expand Iran’s Chabahar Port, connect it to the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, and develop Iran’s first liquefied natural gas plant have all fallen by the wayside. 

http://www.indiadaily.org/images/gas-pipeline-india-iran77_26.jpgWashington even opposed the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline, touted as the “peace pipeline” that would unite India and Pakistan, because it would benefit Tehran

                                                    





Recently, Western pressure brought about the Reserve Bank of India’s largely symbolic decision to prohibit companies from using the Asian Currency Union to pay for Iranian oil – a move that was opposed by Indian business and government ministries.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, India and Iran share cultural ties that go back millennia, and strategic interests and economics remain strong points of confluence. Both seek an alternative to the Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as a new transport line to Central Asia. In 2008, India-Iran trade reached $30 billion, considering third-country intermediaries. In 2009, Iran became the second-largest supplier of crude oil to India, while Indian firms seek to develop Iran’s gas fields, with investments of more than $11 billion over the coming years.


And despite being one of the world’s largest petroleum producers, Iran lacks a significant refinery infrastructure of its own and depends on imports for over 30 percent of its consumption. By some accounts 40 percent of Iran’s imported gasoline comes from Indian refineries – no insignificant matter. This trade and the leverage it brings are threatened by American sanctions that harm India and accomplish little in the way of pressuring Iran.

Indian investment in Iranian hydrocarbons and transport infrastructure, along with strategic alignment with both the US and India in Central Asia and elsewhere, would be a powerful incentive for Iran to make its nuclear program transparent. 

Washington should use New Delhi’s good offices to facilitate a rapprochement with Iran that focuses on mutually beneficial futures, not carrots and sticks..

Neil Padukone is a strategic affairs analyst and author of “Security in a Complex Era.” He is writing a book on the future of conflict in India.

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When the iron's cold

Among the several questions that could have been asked at the prime minister's media conference - but weren't - one omission stood out for how interestingly it captures our malleable emotions. There wasn't a single question about Pakistan. 
 
There were questions on the turmoil in Egypt; even on cricket and the World Cup. But no one, it seems, wanted to quiz Manmohan Singh on what led to the resumption of the dialogue process with Pakistan earlier this month in Thimphu, Bhutan. And unlike the forgotten query on the controversy surrounding the appointment of the central vigilance commissioner, the absence of questions on Pakistan appeared to be from disinterest - not oversight. In other words, we are so distracted by domestic concerns that Pakistan is barely on our minds. Of course, the fact that there has been no major terror strike or volatility in the internal security situation has much to do with our lack of focus. But the truth is that if we - the polity, the media and the people at large - were not so preoccupied by the sense of churn within, the resumption of the talks with Islamabad would have invited the same merciless scrutiny as it has in the past. In fact, Pakistan is so off our collective radar that we've barely noticed the exit of the establishment's bete noire: the bumptious, often abrasive, Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

What makes things interesting is that the Pakistani mindspace seems to be just as distracted. As the assassination of Salman Taseer reminded us, Pakistan's internal implosions are, of course, existential challenges. Despite the avowed India-fixation of General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in many ways, Pakistan today seems more at war with itself than with India. With competing philosophies and groups laying claim to the country's future, the cracks along its faultlines are deepening. 

Currently spooked by spy games that Washington is playing in its backyard, the growing domestic controversy over Raymond Davis (an American arrested for shooting two Pakistanis; he claims in self-defence) only underlines the divisions within the country's ruling establishment over how to navigate the minefields on its journey forward as a country.

Some say Qureshi lost his job as foreign minister for asserting that Davis never had the diplomatic status the Americans are now claiming. Others argue that Qureshi is only playing to the growling anti-American chorus with his proclamations, in case there is an early election. The whispers suggest that Davis is a CIA contractor collecting information on the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and a deal has already been struck by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government to pave the way for him to be handed back to the Americans. Either way, Pakistan's media are focused on the turmoil within. Even Kashmir hardly seems to inflame passions in the same way. So much so that Pakistan's annual marking of Kashmir 'solidarity day' on the eve of the meeting between the two foreign secretaries in Thimphu seemed more ritualistic than felt, and passed without much hoopla on either side.

Ironically, this emotional indifference may provide the best opportunity we have had in a long time for a dispassionate review of the India-Pakistan equation. For too long now, both countries have been trapped in a dysfunctional drama that alternates between love and hate. The schizophrenia has resulted in a deep-seated hostility at times and inexplicable bursts of affection at other moments. Remember the roar of applause when the Pakistani contingent marched in during the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Games? Too many Indo-Pak meetings feed the subcontinental craving for filmy drama right down to slammed doors and jostling over joint statements that never were.

The best thing the two foreign secretaries did for the dialogue process was to save it from the curious and contradictory love-hate melodrama that has defined similar meetings in the past. The future of the two countries belongs neither to the candle-waving romantics who convene at Wagah nor to the venom-spewing hatemongers who unleash their bitterness online (while, of course, befriending every Pakistani possible on Twitter). It belongs to the 'pragmatics' - to borrow a word from Nirupama Rao - who are able to see Pakistan beyond the Punjabi prism of the painful past.

Almost unnoticed and unacknowledged is the remarkable fact that Kashmir is no longer the main obstruction to peace between the two countries. Pakistan's former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has elaborated on the contours of a Kashmir settlement that had the nod of what he calls "all the principal players". He includes in this category, the present army chief of his country. Interestingly, we have seen neither a denial nor a confirmation of his assertions by our own government, with the foreign secretary only offering a "no comment" in a recent interview. But all other things being equal, a broad philosophical consensus does exist on what a possible solution could be to the longstanding Kashmir problem. And it still borrows from the essential template created by President Pervez Musharraf's four-point formula.

That's the good news.

The bad news is that in many ways the challenge of  terrorism is much more intractable than the Kashmir dispute. The 26/11 strikes had precious little to do with the politics of the Kashmir problem. Violence perpetrated against India, its cities and its people by fundamentalist religious groups is now the primary hurdle to cross for peace to have any real meaning. And many doubt that Pakistan's civilian government has the strength, even if it has the will, to do so. With emotions at an ebb on both sides, it's a good time to find out.

Barkha Dutt is Group Editor, English News, NDTV
Barkha Dutt

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The Telengana issue (Hindu Article)

United Andhra Pradesh with constitutional empowerment of Telangana ‘best way forward' 

Srikrishna Committee says separate Telangana is ‘second best option' if unavoidable & all three regions agree
— PHOTOS: P.V . SIVAKUMAR, PTI/ SHAHBAZ KHAN

HARDENING STANCE: Telangana Rashtra Samiti president K. Chandrasekhara Rao with BJP leader Bandaru Dattatreya at a dharna in Hyderabad on Thursday. Both parties are firm on the demand for a separate Telangana State. 
 
NEW DELHI: The Srikrishna Committee has favoured maintaining the status quo of a united Andhra Pradesh and described the demand for a Telangana State as the “second best option.”

In its report, which was made public on Thursday, the Committee found the option of a united Andhra Pradesh the “most workable” in the circumstances and in the best interests of the social and economic welfare of people. “In this option, it is proposed to keep the State united and provide constitutional/statutory measures to address the core socio-economic concerns about the development of the Telangana region,” it said.

The report was submitted to Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on December 30.

The 461-page report lists six options —

(I) maintaining the status quo;
(II) bifurcation of the State into Seemandhra and Telangana, with Hyderabad as a Union Territory, and the two States developing their own capitals in due course; 
(III) bifurcation of the State into the Rayala-Telangana and coastal Andhra regions, with Hyderabad being an integral part of Rayala-Telangana; 
(IV) bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh into Seemandhra and Telangana, with an enlarged Hyderabad metropolis as a separate Union Territory; 
(V) bifurcation of the State into Telangana and Seemandhra as per the existing boundaries, with Hyderabad serving as the capital of Telangana, and Seemandhra having a new capital; and
(VI) keeping the State united by simultaneously providing certain definite constitutional/statutory measures for socio-economic development and political empowerment of the Telangana region — creation of a statutorily empowered Telangana Regional Council.


Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram addresses the media in New Delhi after meeting political parties from Andhra Pradesh on the Telangana issue. 
 
The Committee found the fifth option the “second best,” with a rider that separation “is recommended only in case it is unavoidable and if this decision can be reached amicably among all the three regions.” Considering the option of bifurcating the State into Telangana and Seemandhra as per the existing boundaries, the Committee felt that the continuing demand for a separate Telangana had some merit, and “is not entirely unjustified.” In case, this option was exercised, the apprehensions of the coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema people and others who settled in Hyderabad and other districts of Telangana about their investments, property, livelihood and employment would need to be absolutely addressed.

“Considering all aspects, the Committee felt that while the creation of a separate Telangana would satisfy a large majority of people from the region, it will also throw up several other serious problems. Therefore, after taking into account the pros and cons, the Committee did not think it to be the most preferred, but the second best option,” the report said.

Maintaining the status quo was the least-favoured option. It also found the second and third options “not practicable.” The Committee felt that the fourth option of bifurcating Andhra Pradesh into Seemandhra and Telangana, with an enlarged Hyderabad metropolis as a separate Union Territory, was likely to meet with stiff opposition from the Telangana protagonists, and it might be difficult to reach a political consensus on making this solution acceptable to all.

On the sixth option of keeping the State united, the Committee said it could be done through the establishment of a statutory and empowered Telangana Regional Council with adequate transfer of funds, functions and functionaries. “The Regional Council would provide a legislative consultative mechanism for the subjects to be dealt with by the Council.”

 

The Committee felt that with firm political and administrative management, it should be possible to convince the people of the importance keeping the State united, as this option would be in the best interests of all, and would provide satisfaction to the maximum number of people. “It would also take care of the uncertainty over the future of Hyderabad as a bustling educational, industrial and IT hub/destination.”

Dwelling further on the sixth option, it said that for managing water and irrigation resources equitably, a technical body — water management board — and an irrigation project development corporation with an expanded role were recommended. This should meet all the issues raised by the Telangana people satisfactorily, it said. Flagging socio-economic development and good governance as the core issue, the Committee, keeping the national perspective in mind, was of the considered view that “this option stands out as the best way forward.”

The five-member Committee, headed by the former Supreme Court judge, B. N. Srikrishna, was appointed on February 3, 2010. It examined in detail the issues pertaining to the current demand for a separate Telangana as well as the demand for a united State. The Committee examined all aspects of the situation. Keeping in view the local, regional and national perspectives, it gave the six options.

It examined such parameters as regional, economic and equity analysis, education and health, water resources, irrigation and power development, public employment. It also looked into the issues relating to Hyderabad and the sociological and cultural issues. In the past 11 months, it consulted representatives of industry, trade, trade unions and organisations of farmers, women and students, and all sections of the people, especially the political parties.

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Should we be so much DESPO for the UNSC permanent membership

India's peaceful rise deserves more focus and attention currently than gaining UNSC power, writes N.V.Subramanian.

London, 17 November 2010:

Somewhere, India gives the impression that it has subsumed its great-power ambitions to its quest for permanent membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is a dangerous case of misplaced priorities. The order should be reversed. Or else India will suffer setbacks on both great-power and UNSC permanent membership ambitions. The reasoning is as follows. UNSC permanent membership since it came into being has been a benchmark for state power. De-colonization, the end of the Cold War and globalization have degraded the power status of all the permanent members bar China. 

In small or big or irreversible ways, the US, Russia, France and the UK are declining. Only China or more accurately the Peoples' Republic (PRC) has risen in this duration. 

PRC replaced Taiwan as a veto power in the early seventies reflecting Cold War realities. The veto powers are also NPT-designated nuclear weapons' states. India was offered Taiwan's permanent membership but reportedly Jawaharlal Nehru declined it in favour of PRC possibly to win its friendship. China reciprocated by aggressing against India in nineteen sixty-two. 

Relations between India and China have remained hostile since despite growing trade relations. To aid its rise and fuel its Middle-Kingdom ambitions, China has protected allied pariah states and regimes, including Burma, North Korea, Sudan and Pakistan, by abusing its UNSC power. Seeing the China example, India has invested new virtue and espies vast opportunities in a UNSC permanent membership. 

There are mutterings against Nehru for spurning the fifties' offer of veto power. Surely, there are huge advantages of permanent membership. This is why India ardently has been pressing for it since the previous US president, George W.Bush, offered both the nuclear deal and to make India a great power. 

During his recent visit, president Barack Obama finally supported India's UNSC ambitions with the rider to move on Burma  and to shoulder other international "responsibilities". Even if the tenor of Obama's qualified support was shrill, the substance of it was not off-the-mark. With power comes responsibility. Is India ready to take positions internationally that may conflict with its national interests? This question would never arise if India had reversed its priorities, that is, putting its great-power ambitions ahead of its quest for UNSC permanent membership, making that quest open-ended and hardly a life-and-death matter as it appears to have become today. The fact is that all the veto powers have pulled their weight and/ or made sacrifices in one or another phase of history to justify their gained positions. Because they have come to the UN Security Council from a position of strength, either separately or in an alliance, they have been able to set the agenda. The agenda often hasn't been very agreeable and frequently disastrously discordant. This is why there is so much clamour for reforms. But even a reformed United Nations and UNSC will set agendas not uniformly acceptable, and India will be involved in agenda-making if it becomes a veto power. Now does it make sense for India to be like the older powers that set their own agendas or to succumb to an agenda-making process where its own interests are compromised?

Naturally, it makes sense to be like the older powers, which means, India has to pull its own weight to become a UNSC permanent member. What does "pulling weight" mean? Simply this. India must have all-round economic, political, military and cultural heft to become an influential, transformative and unstoppable world power. 

The fact that Obama endorsed India's UNSC ambitions means India has got the game so far right. But there is a long way to go. The stark reality is that India is rising while the older powers are in decline. But the rise is still not powerful enough to make India an "influential, transformative, unstoppable world power". Short of that, India will lose more by getting permanently into the UN Security Council than by remaining outside it. Indeed, it may be argued that India will decline if it prematurely becomes a UNSC power. To this writer at least, the road map is clear. India's energies largely must be directed to becoming an "influential, transformative, unstoppable world power". 

India should be able to impose its peace  without formal membership in the league of great powers. The membership will come by invitation in short course. This is not to suggest India should abandon diplomacy to win UNSC power soon. But any show of desperation will backfire, particularly with a staunch foe as China. (Its recently expressed willingness to "increase consultations and communications with India" on the UNSC issue should be taken with a pinch of salt.) India should lower the UNSC stakes and more fully focus on its "peaceful rise". 

As with individuals, so with states: It is mostly about influencing and all about winning. 


N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi). Email: envysub@gmail.com.

Source- The Public Affairs Magazine 

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MR OB-AMERICAN administration's WPO (War Process Outsourcing)

CEOs were once too swamped with increasing cost of their businesses but thanks to internet and related sophisticated technologies that those costs have now been translated into sheer profits. Yes, it was BPO (business process outsourcing) which revolutionized the US and European market almost a decade ago. Let it be customer support, telesales, software development, payroll management or any other business process, just shift your burden to under-developing countries like India, Philippines and get your job done at lower price.

BPO looked like an epidemic which kept on spreading across the globe especially India. Pakistan seemed to have been lagging behind in BPO industry while India claiming most of the businesses. When you are pushed to the wall then it is a going all out situation and precisely that is what Pakistan did.

                                                 http://t0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQDI2I5WgjU-nX_Ql4DB3r2gLUcRJV6SsRZAJ6T7heT0R7q35jN


American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 gave them opportunity they barely could afford to miss. Pakistan identified new market that required not B2B but government to government dealing. They offered US to outsource their war on terror to Pakistan. It broke all records of cost efficiency that were associated were BPO. Total expenditure on a US soldier is 80000$/month whereas a Pakistani soldier better familiar with terrain is costing mere 900$/month.

Moreover Pakistan offered some of benefits which other hardly dared to offer

§ Quick response to customer feedback i.e. bombing any random FATA after "do more" statement.
§ Excellent customer support in such a way that to remain apologetic even if you perform well.
§ Complimentary killing of Pakistanis to show their commitment to serve better
§ Being flexible on culture to the extent that customer devised culture was enforced and war on terror became the first slogan of the nation
§ Customer empowerment to such degree that customer can even appoint top brass of Pakistani Government and can even transfer army personnel and strategize the policies of army.
§ Customer can dictate you to join hands with your arch competitors i.e. India.
§ Customer will tell where to spend its payments and will charge for its consultancy.
§ Payments would still subject to approval of customer even if all requirements were met.
§ Customer can always opt out of the contract anytime whereas Pakistan cannot back out with its consent.
§ Even if there is no other country which will agree to aforementioned business with US. Pakistan would still consider it a favor from US and will remain obliged.
§ Customer will not compensate for any damage done to Pakistan while providing services or reaction to those services.

India is still taken aback over such bold strategy to draw foreign investment into the country. Experts believe that with predictions of new wars emerging in years to come, Pakistan will capitalize on competitive advantage they have got over others.

India and rest of the world will feel left out as the time will come.

Source- Ezine Articles

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Have the CBI -lost teeth?

  Does C.B.I.  mean Central Bonded Investigation agency !



Public confidence in the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which had gone up in the wake  of the successful investigation and prosecution of the cases relating to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and the Mumbai blasts of March 1993, has taken a series of beatings during 2010. The Government of
http://t1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSl-ceru1juuXJ8AMMGlkCzjGa_DgWQTW_AR6vtCTOgum2aiUXtTwDr Manmohan Singh has been watching helplessly as the CBI is coming to be viewed increasingly by growing sections of public opinion as a highly unprofessional and politicized agency with neither the will nor the capability to improve the quality of the investigation and prosecution of the cases entrusted to it.

The intriguingly belated response of the CBI to the investigation of the major corruption cases of 2010 entrusted to it has rightly or wrongly created an impression in the minds of the  public that instead of guarding its reputation  as the leading investigation agency of the country, it has let itself become the leading cover-up agency. Neither the  senior officials of the agency nor the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Secretariat have come out with a convincing explanation as to why the CBI moved and continues to move  with disturbing slowness in taking the necessary investigative steps such as raids of the houses and offices of the suspects, freezing of their bank accounts and their interrogation in the cases relating to alleged corruption in  the conduct of the Commonwealth Games and  the handling of the 2G spectrum by A.Raja, former Minister for Telecommunications. The public cannot be blamed if it concludes that the CBI’s objective seems to be not to find out the truth, but to cover up the truth for a sufficiently long time till public memory and outrage over the extent of corruption dissipates.

One saw during 2010  surprising instance of selective leaks to certain sections of the media of some of the tapped telephone conversations of Niira Radia, the lobbyist. Those sections of the tapes which would have contained evidence of criminal wrong-doing have been carefully protected from leakage to the media, but certain sections which had no evidence of criminal wrong-doing, but merely contained material tending to damage the personal reputation of certain eminent persons were leaked to the media by unidentified elements with a suspect motive.

Though the tapping was reportedly authorized at the request of  agencies dealing with tax evasion and money-laundering, the CBI most probably had an interest in the tapping in connection with its investigations. It had an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the intercepts in order to protect the right to privacy of innocent persons. By failing to meet this obligation, the CBI and other agencies involved have let their reputation for professionalism be damaged.

The end of the year saw  yet another blow to the reputation of the CBI when it moved the Ghaziabad Special Court on December 29 for permission to close the case relating to the alleged murder, under mysterious circumstances, of Aarushi, the 14-year-old daughter of Rajesh Talwar and Nupur, a dentist couple living in Noida near Delhi on May 16,2008.

The case was initially mishandled by the UP Police. It was handed over to the CBI on June 1,2008. Public expectation that the CBI, being a reputed professional agency with better capabilities and investigating skills than the UP Police, would unravel the mystery behind the murder and identify, arrest and prosecute the culprits has been belied. The CBI has moved for the closure of the investigation on the ground that it has not been able to make any headway in the investigation and there are no prospects of its making any headway in the future even if it continued with the investigation.

The murder of Aarushi and the subsequent death under mysterious circumstances of a domestic assistant of  her parents had shocked the public. The public was equally shocked by the wildly contradictory accounts of the investigation by the Police and the CBI that were leaked out to the media without any regard to the reputation of Aarushi. The allegations, if true, made by her parents that they were not kept informed by the CBI of its decision to move for the closure of the investigation has shown shocking insensitivity on the part of the CBI.

The lethargic handling of the cases relating to corruption has created strong suspicions in the minds of the public that the CBI’s investigation has been influenced by political considerations. If true, this indicates a politicization of the agency to a degree unsuspected till now. The CBI’s apparent cluelessness in the Aarushi case speak of a worrisome deterioration in the investigation skills of the agency and in the quality of the supervision over its work.

What is even more disturbing is the seeming indifference of the Government to  public criticism of the functioning of the CBI in relation to these and other cases. There has been no attempt on the part of the Government to take the CBI to task for the way it has handled these cases and to convince the public that it has tightened up  the monitoring of the work of the CBI.

The CBI has come under criticism from time to time since the days of the State of Emergency imposed by the Indira Gandhi Government in 1975. The enquiries ordered by the Morarji Desai Government after it came to office in 1977 brought out many instances of serious misdeeds by the CBI during the Emergency. The CBI’s performance again came in for strong criticism during the enquiry into the Bofors scandal in the 1980s. There were allegations even then as there are now that the CBI acts not as an investigating agency, but as a cover-up agency doing the bidding of the party in power.

These criticisms have not led to a comprehensive enquiry into the functioning of the CBI either by a group of eminent professionals with untarnished reputation or by a Joint Parliamentary Committee. The CBI reportedly submits every year a report on its work during the year. These reports hardly figure in debates either in the public or in the Parliament.

The Chinese Government has issued a White Paper--the first of its kind--on December 29 on corruption in China and how the Government has been dealing with the problem. Even in an authoritarian country like China, the Government has felt the need for convincing the public that it is aware of their concerns over  corruption and that it is alive to the need for dealing with the problem in a manner that brings satisfaction to the people.

Despite India being a democracy with its Government supposedly being accountable to the people, the Government has shown a shocking lack of concern over public criticism of the functioning of the CBI and over evidence of a general institutional decay which has permitted corruption to thrive. Public opinion should force the Government to institute a comprehensive enquiry into the functioning of the CBI and initiate measures to restore its image in the eyes of the public.

The indifference of the Government to the institutional decay should not be tolerated by the public.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.

Source -- Outlook

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Article 370: Law and politics

Article 370: Law and politics

While the Constitution recognises in Article 370 the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Central Government's policies since 1953 have totally undermined its autonomy. Senior lawyer and political analyst A.G. NOORANI discusses both aspects and suggests a way out of the mess.
 

"I say with all respect to our Constitution that it just does not matter what your Constitution says; if the people of Kashmir do not want it, it will not go there. Because what is the alternative? The alternative is compulsion and coercion..."
"We have fought the good fight about Kashmir on the field of battle... (and) ...in many a chancellery of the world and in the United Nations, but, above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts and minds of men and women of that State of Jammu and Kashmir. Because, ultimately - I say this with all deference to this Parliament - the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir; neither in this Parliament, nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else," Jawaharlal N ehru said in the Lok Sabha on June 26 and August 7, 1952.
- Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 18, p. 418 and
vol. 19 pp. 295-6, respectively. 

"From 1953 to 1975, Chief Ministers of that State had been nominees of Delhi. Their appointment to that post was legitimised by the holding of farcical and totally rigged elections in which the Congress party led by Delhi's nominee was elected by huge majorities." 
 
- This authoritative description of a blot on our record which most overlook was written by B. K. Nehru, who was Governor of Kashmir from 1981 to 1984, in his memoirs published in 1997 (Nice Guys Finish Second; pp. 614-5). 

THOSE who cavil at Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the "special status" of Kashmir constitutionally ought to remember the "special" treatment meted out to it politically. Which other State has been subjected to such debasement an d humiliation? And, why was this done? It was because New Delhi had second thoughts on Article 370. It could not be abrogated legally. It was reduced to a husk through political fraud and constitutional abuse. The current debate is much more than about restoration of Article 370 by erasing the distortions. It is about redressing a moral wrong.
The United Front government's minimum programme, published on June 5, 1996, said "respecting Article 370 of the Constitution as well as the wishes of the people, the problems of Jammu and Kashmir will be resolved through giving the people of that State t he maximum degree of autonomy."

Constitutional abuse accompanied political fraud. Article 370 was intended to guarantee Kashmir's autonomy. On December 4, 1964, Union Home Minister G. L. Nanda said it would be used to serve as "a tunnel (sic.) in the wall" in order to increase the Cent re's power. 

The State was put in a status inferior to that of other States. One illustration suffices to demonstrate that. Parliament had to amend the Constitution four times, by means of the 59th, 64th, 67th and 68th Constitution Amendments, to extend the President's Rule imposed in Punjab on May 11, 1987. For the State of Jammu and Kashmir the same result was accomplished, from 1990 to 1996, by mere executive orders under Article 370.

Another gross case illustrates the capacity for abuse. On July 30, 1986, the President made an order under Article 370, extending to Kashmir Article 249 of the Constitution in order to empower Parliament to legislate even on a matter in the State List on the strength of a Rajya Sabha resolution. "Concurrence" to this was given by the Centre's own appointee, Governor Jagmohan. G.A. Lone, a former Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, to the State Government described in Kashmir Times (April 20 , 1995) how the "manipulation" was done "in a single day" against the Law Secretary's advice and "in the absence of a Council of Ministers." 

The Nehru-Abdullah Agreement in July 1952 ("the Delhi Agreement") confirmed that "the residuary powers of legislation" (on matters not mentioned in the State List or the Concurrent List), which Article 248 and Entry 97 (Union List) confer on the Union, w ill not apply to Kashmir. The order of 1986 purported to apply to the State Article 249, which empowers Parliament to legislate even on a matter in the State List if a Rajya Sabha resolution so authorises it by a two-thirds vote. But it so amended Article 249 in its application to Kashmir as in effect to apply Article 248 instead - "any matter specified in the resolution, being a matter which is not enumerated in the Union List or in the Concurrent List." 

The Union thus acquired the power to legislate not only on all matters in the State List, but others not mentioned in the Union List or the Concurrent List - the residuary power. In relation to other States, an amendment to the Constitution would require a two-thirds vote by both Houses of Parliament plus ratification by the States (Article 368). For Kashmir, executive orders have sufficed since 1953 and can continue till Doomsday. "Nowhere else, as far as I can see, is there any provision author ising the executive government to make amendments in the Constitution," President Rajendra Prasad pointed out to Prime Minister Nehru on September 6, 1952. Nowhere else, in the world, indeed. Is this the state of things we wish to perpetuate? Uniquely Ka shmir negotiated the terms of its membership of the Union for five months. Article 370 was adopted by the Constituent Assembly as a result of those parleys. 

YET, all hell broke loose when the State Assembly adopted, on June 26, a resolution recording its acceptance of the report of the State Autonomy Committee (the Report) and asked "the Union Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to take positi ve and effective steps for the implementation of the same." On July 4, the Union Cabinet said that the resolution was "unacceptable... would set the clock back and reverse the natural process of harmonising the aspirations of the people of Jammu & Kashmi r with the integrity of the State" - a patent falsehood, as everyone knows. 

The State's Law Minister, P.L. Handoo, said on June 26 that the people "want nothing more than what they had in 1953." Overworked metaphors (about the clock or the waters of the Jhelum which flowed since) do not answer two crucial questions: Can lapse of time sanctify patent constitutional abuse? Can it supply legislative competence? If Parliament has legislated over the States on a matter on which it had no power to legislate, under the Constitution, it would be a nullity. Especially if the State's people have been protesting meanwhile and their voice was stifled through rigged elections. 

Disapproval of Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's opportunist politics should not blind one to the constitutional issues. The State's Finance Minister, Abdul Rahim Rather, a moving spirit behind the Report, resents suggestions of political timing. The repo rt was placed before the Assembly on April 13, 1999. The State Cabinet endorsed its recommendations and decided last April to convene a special session of the Assembly to discuss it. The Government of India was "once again requested to set up a ministeri al committee in order to initiate a dialogue on the report." 

It provides a comprehensive survey of constitutional developments, which is useful in itself for its documentation. It lists 42 orders under Article 370 and gives the following opinion: "Not all these orders can be objected to. For instance, none can obj ect to provisions for direct elections to Parliament in 1966... It is the principle that matters. Constitutional limits are there to be respected, not violated." 

The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India by an Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947 in respect of only three subjects - defence, foreign affairs and communications. A schedule listed precisely 16 topics under these heads plus four others (e lections to Union legislature and the like). 

Clause 5 said that the Instrument could not be altered without the State's consent. Clause 7 read: "Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of India or fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future Constitution." Kashmir was then governed internally by its own Constitution of 1939. 

The Maharaja made an Order on October 30, 1947 appointing Sheikh Abdullah the Head of the Emergency Administration, replacing it, on March 5, 1948, with an Interim Government with the Sheikh as Prime Minister. It was enjoined to convene a National Assembly "to frame a Constitution" for the State. 

Negotiations were held on May 15 and 16, 1949 at Vallabhbhai Patel's residence in New Delhi on Kashmir's future set-up. Nehru and Abdullah were present. Foremost among the topics were "the framing of a Constitution for the State" and "the subjects in res pect of which the State should accede to the Union of India." On the first, Nehru recorded in a letter to the Sheikh (on May 18) that both Patel and he agreed that it was a matter for the State's Constituent Assembly. "In regard to (ii) the Jammu and Kas hmir State now stands acceded to the Indian Union in respect of three subjects; namely, foreign affairs, defence and communications. It will be for the Constituent Assembly of the State when convened, to determine in respect of which other subjects the State may accede" (emphasis added, throughout). 

Article 370 embodies this basic principle which was reiterated throughout (S.W.J.N. Vol. 11; p. 12). 

On June 16, 1949, Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Mammad Afzal Beg, Maulana Mohammed Saeed Masoodi and Moti Ram Bagda joined the Constituent Assembly of India. Negotiations began in earnest on Article 370 (Article 306. A in the draft). N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar tri ed to reconcile the differences between Patel and Abdullah. A text, agreed on October 16, was moved in the Constituent Assembly the next day, unilaterally altered by Ayyangar. "A trivial change," as he admitted in a letter to the Sheikh on October 18. Pa tel confirmed it to Nehru on November 3 on his return from the United States. Beg had withdrawn his amendment after the accord. Abdullah and he were in the lobby, and rushed to the House when they learnt of the change. In its original form the draft woul d have made the Sheikh's ouster in 1953 impossible. 

ARTICLE 370 embodies six special provisions for Jammu and Kashmir. 

First, it exempted the State from the provisions of the Constitution providing for the governance of the States. Jammu and Kashmir was allowed to have its own Constitution within the Indi an Union. 

Second, Parliament's legislative power over the State was restricted to three subjects - defence, external affairs and communications. The President could extend to it other provisions of the Constitution to provide a constitutional framework if they related to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession. For this, only "consultation" with the State government was required since the State had already accepted them by the Instrument. 

But, third, if other "constitutional" provisions or other Union powers were to be extended to Kashmir, the prior "concurrence" of the State government was required. 

The fourth feature is that that concurrence was provisional. It had to be ratified by the State's Constituent Assembly. Article 370(2) says clearly: "If the concurrence of the Government of the State... be given before the Constituent Assembly for the pu rpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon." 

The fifth feature is that the State government's authority to give the "concurrence" lasts only till the State's Constituent Assembly is "convened". It is an "interim" power. Once the Constituent Assembly met, the State government could not give its own "concurrence". Still less, after the Assembly met and dispersed. Moreover, the President cannot exercise his power to extend the Indian Constitution to Kashmir indefinitely. The power has to stop at the point the State's Constituent Assembly draft ed the State's Constitution and decided finally what additional subjects to confer on the Union, and what other provisions of the Constitution of India it should get extended to the State, rather than having their counterparts embodied in the State Const itution itself. Once the State's Constituent Assembly had finalised the scheme and dispersed, the President's extending powers ended completely. 

The sixth special feature, the last step in the process, is that Article 370(3) empowers the President to make an Order abrogating or amending it. But for this also "the recommendation" of the State's Constituent Assembly "shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification". 

Article 370 cannot be abrogated or amended by recourse to the amending provisions of the Constitution which apply to all the other States; namely, Article 368. For, in relation to Kashmir, Article 368 has a proviso which says that no constitutional amend ment "shall have effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir" unless applied by Order of the President under Article 370. That requires the concurrence of the State's government and ratification by its Constituent Assembly

Jammu and Kashmir is mentioned among the States of the Union in the First Schedule as Article 1 (2) requires. But Article 370 (1) (c) says: "The provisions of Article 1 and of this Article shall apply in relation to that State". Article 1 is thus appl ied to the State through Article 370. What would be the effect of its abrogation, as the Bharatiya Janata Party demands? 

Ayyangar's exposition of Article 370 in the Constituent Assembly on October 17, 1949 is authoritative. "We have also agreed that the will of the people through the instrument of the Constituent Assembly will determine the Constitution of the State as wel l as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State... You will remember that several of these clauses provide for the concurrence of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State. Now, these relate particularly to matters which are not mentioned in the Ins trument of Accession, and it is one of our commitments to the people and Government of Kashmir that no such additions should be made except with the consent of the Constituent Assembly which may be called in the State for the purpose of framing its Co nstitution." 

Ayyangar explained that "the provision is made that when the Constituent Assembly of the State has met and taken its decision both on the Constitution for the State and on the range of federal jurisdiction over the State, the President may, on the recomm endation of that Constituent Assembly, issue an Order that this Article 306 (370 in the draft) shall either cease to be operative, or shall be operative only subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified by him. But before he issued an y order of that kind, the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly will be a condition precedent." 

THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with Sheikh Abdullah.
This unique process of Presidential Orders altering constitutional provisions by a mere executive order ends with the final decision of the State's Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar repeatedly said that the State government's concurrence alone will not do. "That concurrence should be placed before the Constituent Assembly when it meets and the Constituent Assembly may take whatever decisions it likes on those matters." (Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol. 8; pp. 424-427). 

In 1949, no one knew when Kashmir's Constituent Assembly would be elected. Ayyangar therefore said: "The idea is that even before the Constituent Assembly meets, it may be necessary... that certain items which are not included in the Instrument of Access ion would be appropriately added to that list in the Instrument... and as this may happen before the Constituent Assembly meets, the only authority from whom we can get consent for the addition is the Government of the State." This was explicitly only for that interim period. 

Article 370 (1) (b) is clear. "The power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to" (1) matters in the Union and Concurrent Lists corresponding to the broad heads specified in the Instrument of Accession "and (ii) such other matte rs in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State the President may by Order specify". An Explanation defined "the Government of the State". Similar "concurrence" was required when extending provisions regarding Union instituti ons beyond the agreed ones. But Article 370 (2) stipulated clearly that if that concurrence is given "before the Constituent Assembly... is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon". 

Once Kashmir's Constituent Assembly was "convened" on November 5, 1951, the State Government lost all authority to accord its "concurrence" to the Union. With the Assembly's dispersal on November 17, 1956, after adopting the Constitution of Jammu and Kas hmir, vanished the only authority which alone could cede: (a) more powers to the Union and (b) accept Union institutions other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession. All additions to Union powers since then are unconstitutional. This unders tanding informed decisions - right until 1957. 

THE Constituent Assembly of India adopted the Constitution on November 26, 1949. A day earlier, the ruler of Kashmir made a Proclamation declaring that it "shall in so far as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the constitutional r elationships between this State and the contemplated Union of India". Article 370 is more than a provision of that solemn document. It is also a sacred compact with the State. On January 26, 1950, the President made his first Order under Article 370, extending specified provisions of the new Constitution to the State. 

On April 20, 1951, the ruler made a Proclamation for convening the State's Constituent Assembly. It met on November 5, 1951. Two issues came to the fore. Nehru was eager to secure Kashmir's "closer integration" with India; the Sheikh to ensure popular go vernance. The Delhi Agreement that followed was announced at a press conference in Delhi on July 24, 1952 by both. This Union-Centre accord had no legal force by itself. Only an Order under Article 370 could confer that - after the Sheikh gave his "concu rrence" formally. 

The Sheikh, meanwhile, pressed for an Order to redraft "the Explanation" in Article 370 redefining the State government as one headed by an elected "Sadar-i-Riyasat (State President)... acting on the advice" of his Ministers. 

As for the Sheikh's request, Nehru wrote on July 29, 1952: "It is not a perfectly clear matter from the legal point of view how far the President can issue notifications under Article 370 several times." On September 6, 1952, President Rajendra Prasad po inted out the illegality of such a course in a closely reasoned Note. (It is appended to the Report.) He questioned "the competence of the President to have repeated recourse to the extraordinary powers conferred on him" by Article 370. "Any provi sion authorising the executive government to make amendments in the Constitution" was an incongruity. He endorsed Ayyangar's views on the finality of a single Order under Article 370. "I have little doubt myself that the intention is that the power is to be exercised only once, for then alone would it be possible to determine with precision which particular provisions should be excepted and which modified." 

The President concluded: "The conclusion, therefore, seems to me to be irresistible that Clause (3) of Article 370 was not intended to be used from time to time as occasion required. Nor was it intended to be used without any limit as to time. The correc t view appears to be that recourse is to be had to this clause only when the Constituent Assembly (sic) (Constitution) of the State has been fully framed." That was over on November 17, 1956. But he yielded to Nehru's pressure and made the Order on Novem ber 15, 1952.
Events took a tragic course. The Sheikh was dismissed from office and imprisoned on August 9, 1953 (vide the writer's article, How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell Out": Economic and Political Weekly; January 30, 1999). On May 14, 1954 came a compr ehensive Presidential Order under Article 370. Although it was purported to have been made with the "concurrence" of the State government it drew validity from a resolution of the Constituent Assembly on February 15, 1954 which approved extension to the State of some provisions of the Constitution of India. The Order sought to implement the Delhi Agreement. The Report makes two valid points. Why the haste since the State's Constitution was yet to be framed? Besides, the order in some respects went beyon d the Delhi Agreement. It certainly paved the way for more such Orders - all with "the concurrence of the State Government", each elected moreover in a rigged poll. Ninetyfour of the 97 Entries in the Union List and 26 of the 47 in the Concurrent List were extended to Kashmir as were 260 of the 395 Articles of the Constitution. 

Worse, the State's Constitution was overridden by the Centre's orders. Its basic structure was altered. The head of State elected by the State legislature was replaced by a Governor nominated by the Centre. Article 356 (imposition of President's Rule) wa s applied despite provision in the State's Constitution for Governor's rule (Section 92). This was done on November 21, 1964. 

On November 24, 1966, the Governor replaced the Sadar-i-Riyasat after the State's Constitution had been amended on April 10, 1965 by the 6th Amendment in violation of Section 147 of the Constitution. Section 147 makes itself immune to amendment. But it referred to the Sadar-i-Riyasat and required his assent to constitutional amendments. He was elected by the Assembly [Section 27 (2)]. To replace him by the Centre's nominee was to alter the basic structure. 

Article 370 was used freely not only to amend the Constitution of India but also of the State. On July 23, 1975 an Order was made debarring the State legislature from amending the State Constitution on matters in respect of the Governor, the Election Co mmission and even "the composition" of the Upper House, the Legislative Council. 

It would be legitimate to ask how all this could pass muster when there existed a Supreme Court of India. Three cases it decided tell a sorry tale. In Prem Nath Kaul vs State of J&K, decided in 1959, a Constitution Bench consisting of five judges unanimously held that Article 370 (2) "shows that the Constitution-makers attached great importance to the final decision of the Constituent Assembly, and the continuance of the exercise of powers conferred on the Parliament and the President by t he relevant temporary provision of Article 370 (1) is made conditional on the final approval by the said Constituent Assembly in the said matters". It referred to Clause 3 and said that "the proviso to Clause (3) also emphasises the importance whi ch was attached to the final decision of Constituent Assembly of Kashmir in regard to the relevant matters covered by Article 370". The court ruled that "the Constitution-makers were obviously anxious that the said relationship should be finally d etermined by the Constituent Assembly of the State itself." 

But, in 1968, in Sampat Prakash vs the State of J&K, another Bench ruled to the contrary without even referring to the 1959 case. Justice M. Hidayatullah sat on both Benches. The court held that Article 370 can still be used to make orders thereunder despite the fact that the State's Constituent Assembly had ceased to exist. 

FOUR BASIC flaws stand out in the judgment. 

  • First, the Attorney-General cited Ayyangar's speech only on the India-Pakistan war of 1947, the entanglement with the United Nations and the conditions in the State. On this basis, the court said, in 1968, that "the situation that existed when this Article was incorporated in the Constitution has not materially altered," 21 years later. It ignored completely Ayyangar's exposition of Article 370 itself; fundamentally, that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir al one had the final say. 

  • Secondly, it brushed aside Article 370 (2) which lays down this condition, and said that it spoke of "concurrence given by the Government of State before the Constituent Assembly was convened and makes no mention at all of the completion" of its work or its dissolution.The supreme power of the State's Constituent Assembly to ratify any change, or refuse to do so, was clearly indicated. Clause (3) on the cessation of Article 370 makes it clearer still. But the court picked on this clause to hold that since the Assembly had made no recommendation that Article 370 be abrogated, it should continue. It, surely, does not follow that after that body dispersed the Union acquired the power to amass powers by invoking Article 370 when the decisive ratificatory body was gone.

  •  Thirdly, the Supreme Court totally overlooked the fact that on its interpretation, Article 370 can be abused by collusive State and Central Governments to override the State's Constitution and reduce the guarantees to naught. Lastly, the court misconstru ed the State Constituent Assembly's recommendation of November 17, 1952, referred to earlier, which merely defined in an explanation "the Government of the State". To the court this meant that the Assembly had "expressed its agreement to the continued op eration of this Article by making a recommendation that it should be operative with this modification only." It had in fact made no such recommendation. The Explanation said no more than that "for the purposes of this Article, the Government of the State means..." It does not, and indeed, cannot remove the limitations on the Central Government's power to concurrence imposed by Clause (2); namely ratification by the Constituent Assembly.
The court laid down no limit whatever whether as regards the time or the content. "We must give the widest effect to the meaning of the word 'modification' used in Article 370 (1)". The net result of this ruling was to give a carte blanche to the Government of India to extend to Kashmir such of the provisions of the Constitution of India as it pleased. 

In 1972, in Mohammed Maqbool Damnoo vs the State of J & K, another Bench blew sky high the tortuous meaning given to the Explanation. It was a definition which had become "otiose". But this Bench also did not refer to the 1959 ruling. Cases there are, albeit rare, when courts have overlooked a precedent. But that is when there is a plethora of them. Article 370 gave rise only to three cases. The first was studiously ignored in both that followed. The court found no difference between an elected S adar and an appointed Governor. "There is no question of such a change being one in the character of that government from a democratic to a non-democratic system." If the Constitution of India is amended to empower the Prime Minister to nominate the Pres ident as Sri Lanka's 1972 Constitution did - would it make no difference to its democratic character, pray? To this Bench "the essential feature" of Article 370 (1) (b) and (d) is "the necessity of the concurrence of the State Government", not the Consti tuent Assembly. This case was decided before the Supreme Court formulated in 1973 the doctrine of the unamendable basic structure of the Constitution. 

GIVEN their record, whenever Kashmir is involved, how can anyone ask Kashmiris to welcome Union institutions (such as the Election Commission) with warmth? 

Sheikh Abdullah had no cards to play when he concluded an Accord with Indira Gandhi and became Chief Minister on February 24, 1975. At the outset, on August 23, 1974, he had written to G. Parthasarathy: "I hope that I have made it abundantly clear to you that I can assume office only on the basis of the position as it existed on August 8, 1953." Judgment on the changes since "will be deferred until the newly elected Assembly comes into being". On November 13, 1974, G.P. and M.A. Beg signed "agreed concl usions" - Article 370 remained; so did the residuary powers of legislation (except in regard to anti-national acts); Constitutional provisions extended with changes can be "altered or repealed"; the State could review Central laws on specified topics (we lfare, culture, and so on) counting on the Centre's "sympathetic consideration"; a new bar on amendment to the State Constitution regarding the Governor and the E.C. Differences on "nomenclature" of the Governor and Chief Minister were "remitted to the p rincipals". Differences persisted on the E.C., Article 356 and other points. On November 25, the Sheikh sought a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Her reply not only expressed doubt on the usefulness of talks but also on his commitment to "the b asic features of the State's Constitution" and to "the democratic functioning" of the government. Hurt, he wrote back ending the parleys. They met at Pahalgam. An exchange of letters, on February 12, 1975, clinched the deal on the basis of the Agreed Con clusions. 

This was a political accord between an individual, however eminent, and the Government, like the Punjab Accord (July 24, 1985); the Assam Accord (August 15, 1985); the Nagaland Accord (November 11, 1975); and the Mizoram Accord (June 30, 1986) - e ach between the government and the opposition. It cannot override Article 370; still less sanctify Constitutional abuse. It bound the Sheikh alone and only until 1977. 

This was explicitly an accord on "political cooperation between us", as Indira Gandhi wrote (December 16, 1974). On February 12, 1975, Abdullah recorded that it provided "a good basis for my cooperation at the political level". In Parliament on March 3, 1975 she called it a "new political understanding". He was made Chief Minister on February 24, backed by the Congress' majority in the Assembly and on the understanding of a fresh election soon. Sheikh Abdullah's memoirs Aatish-e-Chinar (Urdu) rec ord her backtracking on the pledge and the Congress' perfidy in March 1977 when she lost the Lok Sabha elections. It withdrew support and staked a claim to form a government. Governor's Rule was imposed. The Sheikh's National Conference won the elections with a resounding majority on the pledge to restore Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy, which was also Farooq's pledge in 1996. The 1975 accord had collapsed. 

It was, I can reveal, based on gross error. The Agreed Conclusions said (Para 3): "But provisions of the Constitution already applied to the State of J&K without adaptation or modification are unalterable." This preposterous assertion was made in the tee th of the Sampat Prakash case. One order can always be rescinded by another. All the orders since 1954 can be revoked; they are a nullity anyway. Beg was precariously ill and relied on advice which GP's "expert" had given him. He was one S. Balakr ishnan whom R.Venkataraman refers to as "Constitutional Adviser in the Home Ministry" in his memoirs. It is no disrespect to point out that issues of such complexity and consequence are for counsel's opinion; not from a solicitor, still less a bureaucrat even if he had read the law. Even the Law Secretary would have insisted on the Attorney-General's opinion. Amazed at what Beg had told me in May 1975, I pursued the matter and eventually met Balakrishnan in 1987. He confirmed that he had, indeed, given such advice. It was palpably wrong. The 1975 Accord is worse than useless. It is harmful to the State's rights and interests. It has neither legal efficacy nor moral worth. 

Source-- Frontline

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