Editorial on Budget by The Tribune

Focus is on masses, not classes
 
It is a budget for the masses, not classes. It offers small giveaways here and there but takes care not to hurt anybody ahead of assembly elections. The 2010-11 Union Budget’s thrust is on the social sector in keeping with the UPA government’s goal of inclusive growth. It carries the stamp of Congress president Sonia Gandhi. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s reforms may have to wait. Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee is a pragmatic politician and he is best suited for building a consensus on controversial reforms like the goods and services tax (GST), diesel decontrol, labour law amendments, foreign investment in multi-brand retail, banking and PSU privatisation. 

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The GST, when implemented, would have far-reaching consequences on the economy in terms of lowering taxes and raising revenue by curbing tax evasion and the spread of black money. 

Benefits for classes are limited. The salaried class may be disappointed by a modest hike in the tax exemption limit but there is a major reason to cheer. Those having salary as the only income will not have to file returns any more. 

The Budget has reduced the age limit for senior citizens from 65 to 60 for being entitled to the tax exemption limit of Rs 2, 50,000, while for those above 80 a new tax exemption limit of Rs 5,00,000 has been created. Health check-ups in private hospitals will become more expensive. Domestic and foreign travel will cost more as also eating out in AC restaurants. 

This time the fair sex has got no special treatment. Those fond of branded clothes will feel the pinch. 

Aanganwari workers have a reason to rejoice as their pay has been justifiably doubled. 

Soldiers suffering 100 per cent disability in service will get Rs 9 lakh compensation on a par with security personnel fighting the Maoists. 

In the clash between inflation and growth the Finance Minister has favoured the former, which is desirable both politically and morally since the fruits of growth are enjoyed by a small section. From March 2012 those living below the poverty line will start getting cash instead of subsidised fertilisers and fuel. Nandan Nilekani’s Adhaar scheme, when implemented, would make this possible. 

Sonia Gandhi’s favourite project, the National Food Security Bill, is on the table but Pranab Mukherjee has not given details of the fiscal impact of its implementation. Higher spending on education, health and infrastructure is welcome though it is still below the desirable levels.
To control inflation and achieve double-digit growth it has often been suggested that agriculture should be rejuvenated. The budget has increased credit flows to farmers by Rs 1lakh crore. 

Farmers who repay their loans in time will have to pay 3-4 per cent lower interest than the market rates. To step up production and productivity, the budget provides Rs 300 crore each for pulses, oilseeds, vegetables and nutri-cereals like millet and maize. Since 40 per cent of food items go waste in the absence of adequate storage and processing, the budget focusses on some such grey areas. Cold storage chains will get infrastructure status, which means cheaper credit. This may attract higher private investment and help eliminate bottlenecks in food supplies. 


Industry had feared a rollback of tax benefits given in 2008 to help it cope with global slowdown. That has not happened. Instead the surcharge on domestic companies has been cut to 5 per cent from 7.5 per cent. The minimum alternate tax (MAT) has been slightly raised from 18 per cent to 18.5 per cent. The Sensex shot up after the budget but the gains were trimmed to 122 points by the close. Currently, business confidence is low as interest rates are hardening. The surge in global oil prices due to trouble in the Middle East has led to capital outflows. 

For foreign institutional investors (FIIs) a high fiscal deficit is also a matter of concern. The Finance Minister has sent a positive message by bringing down fiscal deficit to 5.1 per cent. FIIs, however, are skeptical about his claims of bringing fiscal deficit further down to 4.6 per cent and ensuring 9 per cent growth in a difficult year ahead. One positive is the government will resort to lower market borrowings and this will reduce pressure on money supply and subsequently on interest rates. High interest rates raise the cost of capital and hurt growth. All in all, given the constraints — political and global — it is hard to find much fault with the budget. Its goal of inclusive growth is right. The fiscal deficit may be under control but it is governance deficit which is becoming unmanageable. Elections are won not just by tall promises but by strong performance.

Bihar has shown votes follow development.

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A New Engagement (Editorial abt relation betwwen India and Arab World in context of Libya !!!)


With each passing day, it becomes more certain that Libya's revolution will not be resolved as swiftly and bloodlessly as Tunisia's and Egypt's did. The Gaddafi clan does not mean to go quietly, and with a section of the military backing them to the hilt, the country is teetering on the brink of civil war.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states watch anxiously while scrambling to use a mixture of palliative measures and heavy-handedness to pacify their own restive populaces. The UN continues to condemn the Libyan regime. Iran is subject to democracy pressures itself but jostles for advantage in West Asia and North Africa.

It's a difficult situation for New Delhi. When the people's push for democracy had momentum as it did in Tunisia and Egypt, deciding on a policy was relatively easier. But in the far murkier waters of Libya and the Gulf where the tussle could be a protracted one, calibrating a response becomes far more difficult. Consider the stakes for New Delhi.

The UAE overtook the US in 2008-09 to become India's largest trading partner, a position it continues to hold today. India's energy security calculus revolves around the region as well. Currently, it is the sixth largest net importer of oil in the world - it's expected to be the fourth largest by 2025 - and imports 70% of its oil needs. Of those imports, 70% comes from the Middle East. Factor in the massive Indian diasporas in the Gulf countries and the complexity of the problem becomes clear.

New Delhi's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states has stood it in good stead in the past, and there is no need to abandon it in case of the turmoil roiling the Arab world. However, it does present an opportunity to project New Delhi's soft power, which is considerable in the region. It presents a working democratic model in a sociocultural environment far closer to the Gulf's than western democracies are - and with none of the political baggage of the latter.

Leveraging this soft power will require a multi-pronged effort. A start could be made by helping set up the electoral process in Egypt as the US has already requested, to the extent called for by the Egyptians. Participating in diplomatic, humanitarian and democracy-building initiatives in the region whenever asked for, while deepening civil society engagement - are all options. It will not be an easy process. But it is in New Delhi's interests to start such an engagement and seize the opportunities that open up.


Source-- TOI



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Cautiously optimistic (Economic Survey --The Hindu Editorial)


The Economic Survey 2010-11 is positive on the macroeconomy without glossing over the challenges. The economy's resilience is seen in its ability to withstand two shocks in quick succession. The ripple effects of the global economic crisis (2007-09) that devastated world growth, trade, and finances have persisted in the form of the European fiscal crisis. 

On the domestic front, the farm sector that saw a negative growth in 2008-09 was further hit by erratic monsoons, severe drought, and unseasonal rains in two successive years. Despite this, the economy is poised to grow at rates seen during the pre-crisis period. On top of an estimated 8.6 per cent growth during the current year, the economy is projected to grow at 9 per cent during 2011-12. The optimistic forecasts as well as the downside risks are in line with the assessment of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council. 

The services sector, for long “the power house of the economy”, with a more than 57 per cent share of the GDP in 2009-10, has started gaining momentum. That should augur well for the medium term growth prospects. Another favourable feature is that India's demographic dividend is yet to peak. The growing trend in savings and investment rates should benefit from the gradual withdrawal of stimulus measures by the government. In a message that could be a pointer to the strategy in the Budget, the Survey notes that once the economy operates around full capacity, it is not the savings and investment rates that will drive growth but skills development and innovation.

http://trak.in/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Indian_economic_recovery1.jpgThe major downside risks to growth are weather, a disproportionate spike in petroleum prices, and a slowdown in the advanced economies. Inflation and a large current account deficit are major concerns. The Survey cautions that higher growth and a faster monetisation of the economy, through financial inclusion, may mean increased money supply and hence more inflationary pressures. It has recommended a phased entry of foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail, apparently in response to the concerns of farmers and consumers. That should also add to stable capital flows. Given its upbeat tone on growth, the Finance Minister is expected to meet the fiscal targets. As part of its reform agenda, the Survey calls for a streamlining of land acquisition and environment clearance procedures, using smart cards to target subsidy payments and issuance of basic banking licences. There should be an unrelenting thrust on infrastructure development. None of these is new or visionary but the Survey has stressed the doable and underlined the priorities in a way that demonstrates pragmatism.

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Let some fresh air in (An Editorial regarding the Jamia Milia Islamia University being granted a minority status)

Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia university being granted a ‘minority status’ has been celebrated by many, including newspapers, as happy news and one which gives Muslims ‘due justice’. Some of Jamia’s teachers and staff even distributed sweets to mark the announcement, which will allow the university to reserve 50% seats for Muslims. 
 

http://www.keralaevents.com/eventphotos/99/Jamia_Millia_Islamia.jpgAs someone who’s lived all his life near the university and studied there, I don’t support this minority tag, despite the fact that the lobby supporting it is far stronger than I could imagine. If the aim of the minority status is to uplift the community from its backwardness, I think it’s only going to push the Muslims into a deeper ghetto. Inclusive growth is possible only with an eclectic diversity of students and staff. Jamia already has enough ‘Muslim’ character, and it does not need any legal status to ensure it. 

Those seeking the minority status argue that leaders like Mohammad Ali Jauhar and Hakim Ajmal Khan established Jamia in 1920, as “they wanted Muslims to keep their education in their own hands, free from governmental interference.” But why do we forget that 1920 was the British period and Jamia was established as a reaction to British interference in Aligarh’s Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO) started by Sir Sayyad Ahmed Khan

Why should we apply the same to the present democratic government, which gives aid to the university? Leaders like Jauhar, Ajmal Khan and others, who we invoke today, were not against non-Muslims taking part in Jamia’s development. Their secular ideals and actions were far greater than what we can aspire to. At one time in Jamia’s history, the lack of funds forced the staff to get one piece of bread a day as salary! Can any staff member or student think of emulating such ideals today? Times have changed and so have the Muslim community and Jamia. If we invoke the name of Ajmal Khan and Jauhar today, we’re only ‘using’ them for selfish gains.

The example of St Stephen’s College in Delhi is often used to justify Jamia’s minority character, as the former already has the status of a Christian institution. I think Jamia’s case can’t be compared with that of St Stephen’s for several reasons. Both institutions have very different histories and objectives. Jamia had a direct involvement with India’s freedom struggle, whereas St Stephen’s was established — according to its prospectus — as a “religious foundation drawing inspiration from the life and teachings of Jesus Christ” by a Christian mission from Westcott House, Cambridge.

Second, the quality of education in both institutions is very different — today, St Stephen’s is considered one of the top Delhi colleges whereas, sadly, Jamia (with the exception of some departments) does not feature high in students’ preference lists. But St Stephen’s high standards have nothing to do with its minority status. It is a part of a long tradition of quality education that convent institutions have diligently held up. Its minority status, while setting precedence for others, was not implemented to uplift the economic condition of Christians but preserve their culture and values.

If the aim of Jamia is to preserve its ‘Muslimness’, then there has never been any compromise on that. According to the present vice-chancellor, Jamia already has 51% Muslim students, and applying the minority status would have no particular effect. For a religious character, Jamia campus and its surroundings have several mosques, Jamia’s staff can take off from work for prayer, can work for lesser hours during Ramazan, school students are taught Urdu and Islamic theology and girl students can wear a veil, besides many other advantages they never get in any ‘mainstream’ institution. Jamia recognises degrees from Islamic madrasas as qualification for admissions into its courses like BA and MA, allowing thousands of madrasa students to get secular education and professional training. Jamia has departments of Urdu, Arabic, Persian and Islamic Studies. The university’s name itself has ‘Islamia’ in it. All this to ensure that ‘Islamic’ culture is upheld even without the minority character.

I think Muslims fear that while being victimised elsewhere in the country with communal biases and violence, their institutions will also get filled with non-Muslims, which would usurp the already shrunk spaces. But won’t accepting mostly Muslim teachers and students in Jamia prevent the entry of bright students and teachers from other communities, whose presence could create a progressive and competitive atmosphere? Interacting with a wide diversity of people is good not only for students’ careers but also to reduce communal prejudices and perceptions of victimisation.

The minority tag has outlived its use and needs to be discarded.

Yousuf Saeed is a Delhi-based independent filmmaker and researcher. The views expressed by the author are personal

Source-- Hindustan Times

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The Jasmine Revolution


Of the world’s 22 Arab states, Tunisia seemed to be the least likely to witness a popular revolution that would force an autocratic president to flee the country. 

http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/files/2011/02/JasminRevolution-400x300.png For decades, it was a showcase for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund — a success story of economic reform and structural adjustment. Yet, the revolution came despite a brutal police state, positive growth rates, and decades-long Western support of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s corrupt regime.



Many Arab countries share some or all of these characteristics, but Tunisia has certain unique features that, combined, have contributed to the success of this democratic revolt.

Unlike many Arab states, Tunisia has a broad middle class, which is highly educated and politically conscious. In the 1960s and 1970s, Habib Bourguiba, the “founder of modern Tunisia,” invested large portions of the state budget in education and in promoting a sizable middle class.

Tunisian society is homogenous and moderate in orientation and demands. Its Islamic movement al-Nahdah (Renaissance Movement) is considered progressive and moderate. For decades, it has embraced the progressive Personal Status Code and the rights of women, which Bourguiba had enshrined in the Tunisian society, recognized pluralism and coexistence of all political and ideological forces, and advocated democracy as the system of government.

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Tunisia is highly urbanized, which explains how protests spread quickly throughout the country. Despite the fact that the revolt began as a spontaneous youth uprising, the political infrastructure with a long history of popular struggle fueled its momentum. Student, teacher, labor and lawyer syndicates showed extraordinary defiance to Ben Ali’s repressive machine, and their steadfastness neutralized the military which refused to carry out the falling president’s orders to shoot at the demonstrators.

Since independence in 1956, Tunisia’s unique military has been de-politicized with a small budget and a civilian head. With 30,000 men, the contingent is smaller in size than the inflated security and police forces that Ben Ali built to safeguard his regime. These elements contributed to the success of the revolution and were ignited by a deep feeling of humiliation at the personal and societal levels.

The act of the educated young Tunisian from the small town of Sidi Bouzeid, who set himself ablaze thus igniting a nation-wide popular revolt, was a protest message not only against poverty, but mainly against humiliation and repression. The demonstrations that ensued held up freedom and dignity among their foremost demands.

The Tunisian revolt will send shock waves to other autocratic Arab regimes and to their western backers. Arab citizens will try to emulate it, while regimes and their western allies will try to contain the growing popular wrath.

It is not difficult to predict who might be next, especially considering most Arab states are corrupt, repressive and frustrating their people’s aspirations for change. Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon could be likely candidates, but what is certain is that the Arab world will not be the same after the successful revolution in Tunisia.

The revolution has shattered several myths: the myth of Middle Eastern democratic exceptionalism, the myth of achieving economic reform without political liberalization, and the myth that western backing of autocratic regimes in the region will maintain stability and protect western strategic interests.

Tunisians who bravely battled Ben Ali’s repressive machine in a non-violent and peaceful resistance show that the key to stability is freedom, dignity and democracy.

This is a lesson that western states have to learn as well. Supporting autocratic regimes and denying the citizens of the region their legitimate rights out of fear of Islamists and change is unethical and cannot be sustained.

The calls for change go beyond grand ideologies, Islamic or leftist, and center on concrete and clear demands that the people of the region now share: freedom, dignity, social justice and democracy.

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US and Iran could become strategic allies – with India's help US and Iran could become strategic allies – with India's help

Tighter sanctions and military threats haven't swayed Iran over its nuclear program. What the West really needs is genuine rapprochement – the kind that India is especially suited to facilitate

 

The standoff with Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program continues. While Washington is arming its Gulf Arab allies in a process of ‘strategic containment,’ hardliners are seeking tighter sanctions and even military options to coerce Iran into compliance.



But these options remain untenable. The "Gulf Security Dialogue" simply postpones the inevitable, neglecting Iran’s unconventional strengths. Sanctions antagonize Tehran, while Russia, Turkmenistan, China, and even smugglers fill the void in Iran’s energy sector. Military strikes and sabotage may set-back but not end Iran’s nuclear program, and provoke Iran to take countermeasures like mining the Strait of Hormuz – not to mention the political backlash. Regime change by support for anti-Tehran militant groups only aggravates Iran, while Iran's democracy movements are calling for civil rights, not government overthrow. And with America trapped in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran could easily play spoiler.

There is a better option: a genuine rapprochement.
As the US withdraws from Iraq, stability there and in the Levant is contingent on Iranian cooperation. In Afghanistan, more than 70 percent and 40 percent of NATO’s supplies and fuel, respectively, pass through northern Pakistan. This is the only transport link between the Arabian Sea and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Afghanistan, keeping the West beholden to Islamabad’s every whim and its supplies subject to attack within Pakistan.

Multiple benefits
A transport link through Iran would reduce this vulnerability, while easing Islamabad’s own security burden. Coordination with Iran would help bring the Afghan warlords in Tehran’s sphere of influence into the political process, and open up a stable trade route to Central Asia.

A US-Iran understanding would also distance Iran from China, countering the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy in South and Central Asia – a greater imperative in light of China’s recently inaugurated Turkmenistan-China pipeline and talk of an Iran-Pakistan-China energy link.

Even Iran would benefit from a US détente. With three million opium users, Iran is the greatest victim of the Afghan opium trade, while the Taliban that threatens the West is similarly anathema to Iran. By partnering with US forces, Iran can direct its influence toward shared strategic aims: countering narcotics trafficking, intelligence cooperation, and stabilizing Afghanistan. The Iranians would also be assured that America would not use Iraq or the Gulf to attack them.

Iran’s geography, petro-power, and Islamist credentials inevitably empower Tehran. America would only benefit if this influence aligned with its own interests. Engaging Iran also opens up its 77-million-strong population to foreign trade and contact after decades of sanctions, strengthening civil society. A lack of engagement, however, leaves the field open for competitors like China to fill the gap.
But the biggest obstacle to a détente today is Iran’s controversial nuclear program.


The US has flanked Iran from the east in Afghanistan, the west in Iraq, the north through US troops in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and the south via the Gulf States. For the Iranians, the best way to resist a hostile United States is an opaque nuclear program – one that is only likely to come clean when American antagonism is gone.


But American “overtures” to this end have been half-hearted at best. American support for anti-Tehran groups like Jundallah and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq continue, while military plans and sanctions have always been the go-to option, limiting the political space for a détente. Tack on Iran’s missile tests, and refusal to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or to end belligerency in Iraq, and it’s easy to see why the debilitating stalemate continues.
How India could help

Enter India, Washington’s new strategic partner.
In the 1990s, many saw a burgeoning “New Delhi-Tehran Axis” in India and Iran’s enhanced economic and strategic ties, including shared opposition to the Taliban. But under American pressure after 2005, India repeatedly voted to condemn Iran in the IAEA.

While failing to coerce Iran, these votes harmed Indo-Iranian relations: 

Indian plans to expand Iran’s Chabahar Port, connect it to the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, and develop Iran’s first liquefied natural gas plant have all fallen by the wayside. 

http://www.indiadaily.org/images/gas-pipeline-india-iran77_26.jpgWashington even opposed the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline, touted as the “peace pipeline” that would unite India and Pakistan, because it would benefit Tehran

                                                    





Recently, Western pressure brought about the Reserve Bank of India’s largely symbolic decision to prohibit companies from using the Asian Currency Union to pay for Iranian oil – a move that was opposed by Indian business and government ministries.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, India and Iran share cultural ties that go back millennia, and strategic interests and economics remain strong points of confluence. Both seek an alternative to the Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as a new transport line to Central Asia. In 2008, India-Iran trade reached $30 billion, considering third-country intermediaries. In 2009, Iran became the second-largest supplier of crude oil to India, while Indian firms seek to develop Iran’s gas fields, with investments of more than $11 billion over the coming years.


And despite being one of the world’s largest petroleum producers, Iran lacks a significant refinery infrastructure of its own and depends on imports for over 30 percent of its consumption. By some accounts 40 percent of Iran’s imported gasoline comes from Indian refineries – no insignificant matter. This trade and the leverage it brings are threatened by American sanctions that harm India and accomplish little in the way of pressuring Iran.

Indian investment in Iranian hydrocarbons and transport infrastructure, along with strategic alignment with both the US and India in Central Asia and elsewhere, would be a powerful incentive for Iran to make its nuclear program transparent. 

Washington should use New Delhi’s good offices to facilitate a rapprochement with Iran that focuses on mutually beneficial futures, not carrots and sticks..

Neil Padukone is a strategic affairs analyst and author of “Security in a Complex Era.” He is writing a book on the future of conflict in India.

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When the iron's cold

Among the several questions that could have been asked at the prime minister's media conference - but weren't - one omission stood out for how interestingly it captures our malleable emotions. There wasn't a single question about Pakistan. 
 
There were questions on the turmoil in Egypt; even on cricket and the World Cup. But no one, it seems, wanted to quiz Manmohan Singh on what led to the resumption of the dialogue process with Pakistan earlier this month in Thimphu, Bhutan. And unlike the forgotten query on the controversy surrounding the appointment of the central vigilance commissioner, the absence of questions on Pakistan appeared to be from disinterest - not oversight. In other words, we are so distracted by domestic concerns that Pakistan is barely on our minds. Of course, the fact that there has been no major terror strike or volatility in the internal security situation has much to do with our lack of focus. But the truth is that if we - the polity, the media and the people at large - were not so preoccupied by the sense of churn within, the resumption of the talks with Islamabad would have invited the same merciless scrutiny as it has in the past. In fact, Pakistan is so off our collective radar that we've barely noticed the exit of the establishment's bete noire: the bumptious, often abrasive, Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

What makes things interesting is that the Pakistani mindspace seems to be just as distracted. As the assassination of Salman Taseer reminded us, Pakistan's internal implosions are, of course, existential challenges. Despite the avowed India-fixation of General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in many ways, Pakistan today seems more at war with itself than with India. With competing philosophies and groups laying claim to the country's future, the cracks along its faultlines are deepening. 

Currently spooked by spy games that Washington is playing in its backyard, the growing domestic controversy over Raymond Davis (an American arrested for shooting two Pakistanis; he claims in self-defence) only underlines the divisions within the country's ruling establishment over how to navigate the minefields on its journey forward as a country.

Some say Qureshi lost his job as foreign minister for asserting that Davis never had the diplomatic status the Americans are now claiming. Others argue that Qureshi is only playing to the growling anti-American chorus with his proclamations, in case there is an early election. The whispers suggest that Davis is a CIA contractor collecting information on the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and a deal has already been struck by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government to pave the way for him to be handed back to the Americans. Either way, Pakistan's media are focused on the turmoil within. Even Kashmir hardly seems to inflame passions in the same way. So much so that Pakistan's annual marking of Kashmir 'solidarity day' on the eve of the meeting between the two foreign secretaries in Thimphu seemed more ritualistic than felt, and passed without much hoopla on either side.

Ironically, this emotional indifference may provide the best opportunity we have had in a long time for a dispassionate review of the India-Pakistan equation. For too long now, both countries have been trapped in a dysfunctional drama that alternates between love and hate. The schizophrenia has resulted in a deep-seated hostility at times and inexplicable bursts of affection at other moments. Remember the roar of applause when the Pakistani contingent marched in during the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Games? Too many Indo-Pak meetings feed the subcontinental craving for filmy drama right down to slammed doors and jostling over joint statements that never were.

The best thing the two foreign secretaries did for the dialogue process was to save it from the curious and contradictory love-hate melodrama that has defined similar meetings in the past. The future of the two countries belongs neither to the candle-waving romantics who convene at Wagah nor to the venom-spewing hatemongers who unleash their bitterness online (while, of course, befriending every Pakistani possible on Twitter). It belongs to the 'pragmatics' - to borrow a word from Nirupama Rao - who are able to see Pakistan beyond the Punjabi prism of the painful past.

Almost unnoticed and unacknowledged is the remarkable fact that Kashmir is no longer the main obstruction to peace between the two countries. Pakistan's former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has elaborated on the contours of a Kashmir settlement that had the nod of what he calls "all the principal players". He includes in this category, the present army chief of his country. Interestingly, we have seen neither a denial nor a confirmation of his assertions by our own government, with the foreign secretary only offering a "no comment" in a recent interview. But all other things being equal, a broad philosophical consensus does exist on what a possible solution could be to the longstanding Kashmir problem. And it still borrows from the essential template created by President Pervez Musharraf's four-point formula.

That's the good news.

The bad news is that in many ways the challenge of  terrorism is much more intractable than the Kashmir dispute. The 26/11 strikes had precious little to do with the politics of the Kashmir problem. Violence perpetrated against India, its cities and its people by fundamentalist religious groups is now the primary hurdle to cross for peace to have any real meaning. And many doubt that Pakistan's civilian government has the strength, even if it has the will, to do so. With emotions at an ebb on both sides, it's a good time to find out.

Barkha Dutt is Group Editor, English News, NDTV
Barkha Dutt

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